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INTRODUCTION

Prior to the health calamity that is the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries,
including Canada and the United States, were experiencing lower-than-optimal
uptake of immunization.1 This is despite the fact that immunization is recognized
as one of the most effective means of controlling certain diseases and conditions,
and as contributing to a range of other concomitant social, health, and economic
benefits.2 Immunization rates can be undermined by a variety of personal circumstances (e.g., ignorance and lack of access to good information, poverty, geography, employments conditions, etc.), external influences (e.g., misinformation, disinformation, vaccine-negative social networks), and structural
barriers (e.g., dispersal of healthcare facilities, vaccine stock-outs, ineffective
public health infrastructure, technical capacity, or practices and logistics). Immunization rates can be further eroded by unanticipated or unprepared-for disruptive events such as the outbreak of an infectious disease for which there is no
vaccine (e.g., COVID-19).3 Indeed, such events can disrupt immunization strategies and activities in a variety of ways that linger well after the emergency itself
has been managed. This makes anticipating, planning for, assessing, and then
learning from such events critically important.
As of February 1, 2021, COVID-19 has resulted in some 102,399,513 recorded or confirmed cases of COVID-19 worldwide, with 2,217,005 deaths,4 to

1
Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten: United
States, 2015‐16 School Year, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1057–64 (2016); Sarah
Reagan‐Steiner et al., National, Regional, State, and Selected Local Area Vaccination Coverage Among Adolescents Aged 13‐17 Years: United States, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY REP. 850-58 (2016); Flu Vaccination Coverage, United States, 2014‐15 Influenza Season,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage‐1415estimates.htm; Joan Robinson, Potential
Strategies to Improve Childhood Immunization Rates in Canada, 23 PAEDIATRICS & CHILD
HEALTH 353–56 (2018).
2
See Vanessa Rémy et at., Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1 (2015); Vanessa Rémy et al., The Economic Value
of Vaccination: Why Prevention is Wealth, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1 (2015); Mark
Doherty et al., Vaccine Impact: Benefits for Human Health, 34 VACCINE 6707–14 (2016);
Jason Schwartz & Adel Mahmoud, When Not All That Counts Can be Counted: Economic
Evaluations and the Value of Vaccination, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 208–11 (2016).
3
Amina Zafar, Putting Off Kids’ Vaccines During COVID-19 Heightens Risk of Other
Outbreaks, CBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/covid-19-child-immunizations-1.5543286.
4
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO]
(2021), https://covid19.who.int/.
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which Canada contributed 778,972 cases and 20,032 deaths,5 and the World
Health Organization (WHO) has emphasized the human and social costs behind
these numbers.6 The global mortality rate for COVID-19 has placed intense pressure on governments to fast-track vaccine development and approval,7 the accepted wisdom being that COVID-19 will only be controlled once safe and effective vaccines become widely available.8 Developing, testing, delivering and
administering, and monitoring these vaccines, however, presents a range of challenges for which public health frameworks are not consistently well-equipped.
Difficulties arise because:
•
•
•
•

different types of COVID-19 vaccines have been developed for use
(i.e., killed, live attenuated, non-replicating adenovirus vector, protein subunit, replicating virus vector, mRNA and DNA);9
the vaccines have different mechanisms of action, and safety and efficacy profiles;10
supplies will be unevenly available;11 and
effective and equitable deployment of such large stocks create logistical and technical challenges (e.g., geography, cold-chain management).12

5
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Epidemiology Update, GOV’T CANADA (Feb.
1, 2021), https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/epidemiological-summary-covid-19cases.html?stat=num&measure=deaths&map=pt#a2.
6
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Situation Report 204, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
[WHO] 1, 2 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200811-covid-19-sitrep-204.pdf?sfvrsn=1f4383dd_2.
7
Barney S. Graham, Rapid COVID-19 Vaccine Development, 368 SCIENCE 945 (2020).
8
Marius Gilbert et al., Preparedness and Vulnerability of African Countries Against Importations of COVID-19: A Modelling Study, 395 LANCET 871 (2020).
9
As of this writing, nine vaccines have been authorized for use. Jeff Craven, COVID-19
Vaccine Tracker, REGULATORY FOCUS (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2020/3/covid-19-vaccine-tracker. The Pfizer-BioNtech Comirnaty
BNT162b2 vaccine and the Moderna COVID-19 mRNA-1273 vaccine are approved in Canada. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Vaccines: Overview, GOV’T CANADA (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/diseases/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/vaccines.html.
10
Jennifer A. Juno et al., Humoral and Circulating Follicular Helper T Cell Responses in
Recovered Patients with COVID-19, NATURE MED. ONLINE (2020).
11
Katie Dangerfield, Canada’s ‘Slow’ Rollout of Coronavirus Vaccine ‘Embarrassing’:
Experts, GLOBAL NEWS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://globalnews.ca/news/7553419/coronavirus-vaccine-canada-distribution-slow/; Rebecca Robbins, Frances Robles & Tim Arango, Here’s Why
Distribution of the Vaccine Is Taking Longer Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/health/vaccine-distribution-delays.html.
12
Melinda C. Mills & David Salisbury, The Challenges of Distributing COVID-19 Vaccinations, LANCET (Dec. 8, 2020).
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These difficulties can give rise to equity and prioritization issues, delays, failures, etc., which could, in turn, undermine confidence in the vaccines and the
systems through which they are administered, and in public health institutions
and actors generally. This would compound the uncertainty, caution, and even
recalcitrance that has already been instigated by the highly compressed development and authorization processes of the COVID-19 vaccines;13 while the traditional timeline for new vaccine development is fifteen to twenty years, COVID19 vaccines have been developed and rolled out within a startling twelve to eighteen months.14
Given the above, the manner in which COVID-19 vaccines are authorized for
use, and how well we can assess how they are performing will influence how
both these vaccines and other (routine) vaccines are received by the public moving forward, our practices and processes can either encourage or undermine
COVID-19 vaccine acceptance, and vaccine acceptance more generally in the
longer term.15 At The Future of Global Healthcare Governance conference, we
were invited to consider how—in pursuit of the ‘collective good’ that is necessary in response to the pandemic—governments and law might positively influence vaccine confidence and acceptance.16 In this paper, we examine how law is
serving as a possible barrier to COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 immunization
goals, with an emphasis on the Canadian situation, which is generally comparable to other high-income countries with similar regulatory systems.17
13
Angela Jung, New Survey Finds More Canadians are Hesitant About Getting a Vaccine
Against COVID-19, British Columbia, CTV NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://bc.ctvnews.ca/newsurvey-finds-more-canadians-are-hesitant-about-getting-a-vaccine-against-covid-191.5131271; Tara Azimi et al., COVID-19 Vaccines Meet 100 Million Uncertain Americans,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticalsand-medical-products/our-insights/covid-19-vaccines-meet-100-million-uncertain-americans#; Doubts About Vaccines in General and the Speed of Making the COVID-19 Vaccines
Have Some Taking a Cautious View, NORTON HEALTHCARE (Dec. 22, 2020), https://nortonhealthcare.com/news/reaching-those-skeptical-about-covid-19-vaccines/. See also COVID-19
Vaccine Deployment: Behaviour, Ethics, Misinformation and Policy Strategies, ROYAL SOC’Y
(Oct. 21, 2020), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/set-c/set-c-vaccine-deployment.pdf?la=en-GB&hash=43073E5429C87FD2674201CA19280A8E.
14
Nicole Lurie et al., Developing Covid-19 Vaccines at Pandemic Speed, 382 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1969 (2020); Penny Heaton, The Covid-19 Development Multiverse, 383 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1986 (2020).
15
In this regard, we note that the aim of “immunizations throughout the life-course,” demands much greater attention to program integration and rationalization, and to adult immunization, a matter which the eventual immunization against COVID-19 will foreground. Immunization Agenda 2030: A Global Strategy to Leave No One Behind, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
[WHO] 25 (Apr. 1, 2020).
16
University of Georgia School of Law Dean Rusk International Law Center and Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law Conference: The Future of Global Health Governance (Jan. 25, 2021), http://www.law.uga.edu/gjiclspring2021.
17
This paper is an outcome of the Trust, Acceptance and Sufficiency: Law as a Barrier
to, and Enabler of, Routine and Responsive Immunization, Including COVID-19 project,
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Specifically, we examine elements of the Canadian vaccine development and
safety ecosystem, contending that the subject elements are characterized by
shortcomings that combine to undermine trust in the system and the vaccines it
makes available.
We begin by briefly outlining the vaccine development and safety ecosystem
in Canada, identifying its key stages and mechanisms. We then explore in more
detail two elements of that ecosystem. First, we examine the market authorization stage, focusing on how it was used in response to COVID-19. We argue that
the manner in which it has functioned, both generally and throughout the
COVID-19 pandemic, exhibits a systemic operational weakness, being a lack of
sufficient and appropriate transparency. Second, we explore the post-deployment
or clinical surveillance stage, arguing that its mechanisms aimed at identifying
and reporting ‘adverse events following immunization’ (AEFIs) are characterized by an improper absence of standards, signifying design shortcomings. These
shortcomings have been accentuated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and could, in
turn, undermine actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
As a preliminary matter, we note that we accept the WHO definition of an
AEFI as “any untoward medical occurrence which follows immunization and
which does not necessarily have a causal relationship with the usage of the vaccine.”18 Common non-serious AEFIs include redness and swelling at the injection site or mild fever.19 These will often be detected in the clinical trials, and
they do not preclude vaccine approval so long as they are not excessively experienced. As such, they are not the sort of AEFIs that health authorities are interested in capturing; they are merely a mild and expected consequence of taking a
compound designed to stimulate the immune system, and they should be addressed as a routine part of the usual consent and administering process. It is the
serious AEFIs that the surveillance system is interested in capturing, for these
have important consequences for the safety and efficacy profile of the vaccine,
which in turn have potential implications for recommendations about routine use
issued by national immunization advisory authorities, as well as the acceptance
of the vaccine by the public.
We close by offering some recommendations on what governments can do to
ensure that these stages of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem are
more effectively working in pursuit of the collective good.

which was funded in part by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Institutes
of Health Research, and received ethics approval by the IWK Health Centre Research Ethics
Board on October 29, 2020.
18
REPORT OF CIOMS/WHO WORKING GROUP ON VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE,
DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF TERMS FOR VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE 39 (2012).
19
Id.
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THE CANADIAN VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND SAFETY
ECOSYSTEM

In this section, we briefly describe the major components of what we consider
to be the Canadian ‘vaccine development and safety ecosystem.’ This is the collection of post-innovation regulatory architectures and practices that is comprised of the pre-clinical stage, the market authorization stage, the routine use
assessment stage, and the clinical surveillance stage of vaccine development, assessment, deployment, and reassessment.
Once a vaccine compound has been theorized and prepared, its further development and testing begins in the pre-clinical stage, where vaccines, like other
therapeutic products, are expected to undergo laboratory-based safety and efficacy evaluations in animals and in humans. Phase I trials in humans involve 20100 volunteers and focus on detecting serious side effects. Phase II trials generally involve hundreds of volunteers, and they are meant to determine the best
dose and number of doses for effectiveness and safety. Phase III trials involve
several thousand volunteers and undertake comparisons with placebos or already-licensed vaccines.20 It is the responsibility of the vaccine sponsor/manufacturer to ethically generate at least threshold data that demonstrates that the
proposed vaccine is safe and effective, after which it applies for a license from
Health Canada’s Biological and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate
(BRDD).21
The pre-clinical stage is followed by the licensing stage, which gatekeeps market access. In keeping with other major frameworks in high-income countries
and intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Union, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States), Health Canada is responsible, under the
Food and Drugs Act (FDA),22 and the related Food and Drug Regulations
(FDR),23 for assessing therapeutic products. The law grants the Minister and his
or her designees extensive powers, including those of inspection, the ordering of
production, the seizure of material, and, ultimately, the issuing of licenses to import, manufacture, and sell therapeutic products in Canada.24 It also requires

20
Glossary of Common Terms, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (NIH), https://www.nih.gov/healthinformation/nih-clinical-research-trials-you/glossary-common-terms (accessed June 14,
2021).
21
Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA,
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/biologics-genetic-therapies-directorate.html#wb-cont (last
updated Oct. 20, 2020).
22
R.S.C. 1985, c F-27, s. 21 (Can.).
23
Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c 870 (Can.).
24
Food & Drug Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27, ss 22–30 (Can.).
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sponsors or manufacturers to provide scientific evidence of the product’s quality,
safety, and efficacy.25
With respect to new drug submissions (NDS) for Schedule D drugs (biologic
drugs for humans), the Centre for Biologics Evaluation (CBE), part of the
BRDD, evaluates the research protocol, the conduct of the clinical trials and their
data, the manufacturing protocols, and the purity and potency testing that has
been undertaken.26 In doing so, it tests and analyzes the products and conducts a
risk-benefit analysis, taking into consideration internationally agreed-upon
standards for good laboratory practices, good manufacturing practices, good
clinical practices, etc.27 It is also empowered to conduct on-site evaluations
(OSE), which are product-specific assessments of the quality (chemistry and
manufacturing) component of a drug submission to confirm the ability of the
manufacturer to consistently produce a safe biologic drug.28 If the evidence supports the submitter’s quality, safety, and efficacy claims, and the benefits of the
product outweigh the risks, Health Canada will issue a Notice of Compliance
(NOC) and a Drug Identification Number (DIN), and the product can be sold in
Canada through the Lot Release Program.29
Post-approval, the National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI)
determines whether the product will be recommended for routine use in Canada.30 This is a formal review conducted by independent experts in infectious
25
Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C. c 870 (Can.), Div. 8. Division 5 deals with the import
or sale of drugs for purposes of conducting clinical trials, addressing such issues as serious
unexpected adverse reactions and the suspension or cancellation of trials. Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C. c 870 (Can.), Div. 5.
26
Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/biologic-radiopharmaceutical-drugs-directorate.html.
27
Guidance Document Non-Clinical Laboratory Study Data Supporting Drug Product
Applications and Submissions: Adherence to Good Laboratory Practice, HEALTH CAN. (Apr.
30, 2010), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drugproducts/applications-submissions/guidance-documents/non-clinical-laboratory-study-datasupporting-drug-product-applications-submissions-adherence-good-laboratory-practice.html.
For more on these, see INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION,
http://www.ich.org/home.html (last visited June 9, 2021).
28
See Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA,
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/biologics-genetic-therapies-directorate.html#wb-cont (last
updated Oct. 20, 2020); Regulatory Roadmap for Biologic (Schedule D) Drugs in Canada,
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/biologics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/regulatory-roadmap-for-biologicdrugs.html#wb-cont (last updated Feb. 19, 2021).
29
GOV’T CANADA, supra note 26.
30
National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI): Membership and Representation, GOV’T CANADA (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/immunization/national-advisory-committee-on-immunization-naci/naci-membership-representation.html.
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diseases, public health, vaccine safety, epidemiology, paediatrics, nursing, and
internal medicine. NACI reviews the safety and efficacy data on both new and
existing vaccines on an ongoing basis. As new efficacy and safety data are reported post-licensure, recommendations are updated. NACI members are precluded from making recommendations for any vaccine if they have a conflict of
interest.31
The last element of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem is clinical
surveillance, or ‘pharmacovigilance.’ This is about the detection, assessment,
understanding, prevention, and communication of AEFIs and ‘vaccine failures,’32 or any other vaccine- or immunization-related issues. Pre-clinical trials
are not usually large enough to detect rare (>0.01% and < 0.1%) and very rare (<
0.01%) AEFIs, nor those where onset is much delayed.33 These are only detected
when very large numbers of people have been immunized (i.e., after the vaccine
has been approved for use and deployed widely). Under the Food and Drug Regulations, responsibilities are imposed on vaccine manufacturers (or market authorization holders) regarding post-market safety monitoring, reporting, and, in
some cases, specific safety studies,34 and they are expected to submit safety update reports that contain all global data related to the use of their product.
In the following sections, we argue that the Canadian vaccine development
and safety ecosystem, like similar systems in other jurisdictions, is either operating or is designed, depending on the issue, sub-optimally. While a number of
elements could be examined to demonstrate this claim, we focus on insufficient
transparency in the market authorization stage (being an operational shortcoming), and insufficiently clear and harmonized standards in the clinical surveillance stage (being a design shortcoming). Combined, these shortcomings serve

31

Shalini Desai et al., Canada’s National Advisory Committee on Immunization: Celebrating 50 Years, CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES & MED. MICROBIOLOGY 126 (May–June
2015).
32
A vaccine failure is confirmed when the target disease is detected in individuals vaccinated for that disease. A vaccine failure would typically constitute an AEFI. With respect to
COVID-19, identifying vaccine failures requires a systematized way of tracking that a person
who is testing positive for COVID-19 has previously been vaccinated against COVID-19.
Making such a determination is difficult if there exists no central data system that healthcare
workers can access to identify a patient’s immuno-status, as is the case in Canada.
33
CIOMS/WHO WORKING GROUP ON VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE, supra note 18.
34
Vaccine Safety Basics Learning Manual, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] 28 (2013),
https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/initiative/tech_support/Vaccine-safety-E-course-manual.pdf (“[V]accines may undergo clinical trials after licensure to assess the effects of changes
in vaccine formulation, vaccine strain, age at vaccination, number and timing of vaccine doses,
simultaneous administration and interchangeability of vaccines from different manufacturers
on vaccine safety and immunogenicity . . . .”); see also id. (further explaining that “to improve
detection of AEFIs that are not detected during pre-licensure trials, some vaccines have undergone formal Phase IV Surveillance Studies with cohorts as large as 100,000 and durations
of 4–6 years.”).
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to undermine trust in the system, its actors, and its outcomes, and thereby contribute to vaccine hesitancy,35 and to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in particular.

III.

THE MARKET AUTHORIZATION STAGE: INSUFFICIENT
TRANSPARENCY AND PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY

To begin, transparency has not been a hallmark of therapeutic product market
approval processes in Canada. Prior to the modernization of the therapeutic products regulatory system through the adoption of the Protecting Canadians from
Unsafe Drugs Act (Vanessa’s Law),36 Health Canada had been subject to repeated and scathing criticisms in relation to its information use and disclosure,
its perceived culture of secrecy, and its regulatory capture by the pharmaceutical
industry.37 Vanessa’s Law had the dual objectives of providing a modern platform upon which to support an emergent biotechnology sector and improving
confidence in the oversight of therapeutic products by strengthening safety oversight, improving reporting of serious adverse drug reactions by certain health

35
Martin Letendre, The Montreal Tuberculosis Outbreak Revisited, VERITAS IRB (Apr.
11, 2016), https://researchethicssimplified.com/the-montreal-tuberculosis-outbreak-revisited/; Emilie Karafillakis et al., HPV Vaccination in a Context of Public Mistrust and Uncertainty: A Systematic Literature Review of Determinants of HPV Vaccine Hesitancy in Europe,
15 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1615 (2019).
36
S.C. 2014, c 24 (Can.) (amending the FDA and FDR).
37
Matthew Herder, Unlocking Health Canada’s Cache of Trade Secrets: Mandatory Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results, 184 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 194 (2012); Andrew Prayle et
al., Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trial Results on ClinicalTrials.gov:
Cross-sectional Study, 344 BMJ d7373 (2012); Joel Lexchin, Health Canada and the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Preliminary Analysis of the Historical Relationship, 9 HEALTHCARE
POL’Y 22 (2013); Matthew Herder, A New Bill Will Make Health Canada’s Drug Approvals
More Transparent. In Theory, Anyway, NAT’L POST (Nov. 5, 2014), https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matthew-herder-a-new-bill-will-make-health-canadas-drug-approvalsmore-transparent-in-theory-anyway; Matthew Herder, Denaturalizing Transparency in Drug
Regulation, 8 MCGILL J. L. & HEALTH S57 (2015); Joel Lexchin, Private Profits vs. Public
Policy: The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Canadian State, U. TORONTO PRESS (2016).
With respect to the opacity around decisions relating to COVID-19 vaccines, see Cormac
MacSweeney, Trudeau Government Silent on Drug Manufacturer Liability for COVID-19
Vaccines, CITYNEWS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.citynews1130.com/2020/12/08/trudeaugovernment-liability-covid-19-vaccines/. See also Sandra J. Bean, Emerging and Continuing
Trends in Vaccine Opposition Website Content, 29 VACCINE 1874 (2011); David Broniatowski
et al., Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1378 (2018); John D. Lee, The Utter Familiarity of Even
the Strangest Vaccine Conspiracy Theories, ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/familiarity-strangest-vaccine-conspiracy-theories/617572/.
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care institutions, and increasing transparency.38 It enabled Health Canada, for the
first time, to:
•
•
•
•

compel further testing on products, including when issues arise with
at-risk populations;
require label and package changes when serious risks are identified;
recall unsafe products; and
impose tougher penalties for unsafe products.

However, by 2017, Health Canada had not yet exercised its new authority despite cases where it might have justifiably done so,39 and it was not until December 2019 that it had adopted regulations, through which much of the amendments
work.40
The pre-existing frustration over Health Canada’s lack of transparency has
been compounded by the pandemic, during which therapeutic products (including vaccines) have entered the pre-clinical and market authorization stages, and
in some cases clinical use, with little reliable information furnished to the public,41 or indeed little reliable information at all.42 With respect to COVID-19 related clinical trials, the following has been observed:
[T]rials are being rapidly authorized and misinformation about
merits of various experimental interventions is prevalent. Delaying disclosure of clinical trial designs, correspondence between
regulators and sponsors about those designs, and the basis for crucial decisions to be made by [data safety monitoring boards]
about whether to halt or modify a trial at the point of interim analysis until after the decision to authorize or approve the
38
Katherine Fierlbeck, Reforming the Regulation of Therapeutic Products in Canada:
The Protecting of Canadians from Unsafe Drugs Act (Vanessa’s Law), 4 HEALTH REFORM
OBSERVER, ART. 5 (2016).
39
Adrienne Schnier, The Protecting Canadians from Unsafe Drugs Act: What is Happening with Vanessa’s Law?, 90 OBITER DICTA 9 (2017).
40
Id.
41
For example, while Health Canada discloses a fairly significant amount of information
through its Clinical Information Portal, launched in March 2019, much of the safety and efficacy data is disclosed post-approval, and that data is comprised primarily of the Clinical Study
Reports, not the agency review itself (other than a high-level summary of decisions taken).
Sterling Edmonds et al., Transparency Too Little, Too Late? Why and How Health Canada
Should Make Clinical Data and Regulatory Decision-Making Open to Scrutiny in the Face of
COVID-19, 19 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 7 (2020), https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/7/1/lsaa083/5991911.
42
Id. Health Canada authorized remdesivir, a COVID-19-targeting drug, on the basis of
study protocols and preliminary or topline results; the CSRs that normally accompany an NDS
were not provided.
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intervention pre-empts the correction of potential flaws in trial
designs and limits the opportunity to build public understanding
of the knowledge and uncertainties behind a given COVID-19 intervention.43
Lack of transparency around the relationship that exists between regulators
and regulatees, the evidence that is generated during vaccine development and
testing, and the evidence relied on to grant market access is a particularly pernicious problem in the vaccine setting because vaccine acceptance is persistently
hampered by concerns around insufficient evidence, secrecy, and governmentpharma ‘coziness’ and conspiracies.44
In the market authorization stage, Health Canada bases its level or intensity of
regulatory oversight—testing or protocol review and compliance monitoring—
on the degree of risk felt to be associated with the product.45 Neither the reasons
for this variability of scrutiny, nor indications as to when it is in play and what
standard is being applied, are well communicated to the public, nor are the other
market access flexibilities.46 The most opaque flexibility—discretionary use of
43

Id.
A search in CanLII using the terms “vaccine” and “vaccination” and “conspiracy” turns
up fifty-seven court cases. A common scenario is that estranged parents are in conflict over
the immunization of the children of the marriage, and the vaccine-refusing parent introduces
into evidence opinions about government-pharma conspiracies. See, e.g., A.P. v. L.K., [2021]
ONSC 150 (2021).
45
Regulatory Roadmap for Biologic (Schedule D) Drugs in Canada, GOV’T CANADA
(July 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/biologics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/regulatory-roadmap-for-biologic-drugs.html#wbcont; Compliance and Enforcement Policy for Health Products (POL-0001), HEALTH CANADA
(Dec. 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/compliance-enforcement/good-manufacturing-practices/policies-standards/compliance-enforcement-health-products.html.
46
Presently, the Canadian regulatory framework contains two regular accelerated pathways for drug approval and access. The first is the Extraordinary Use New Drugs (EUND),
which allows the authorization of drugs based on non-clinical information and limited clinical
information, and which is available in circumstances where sponsors cannot reasonably provide substantial evidence to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a new drug in humans due
to logistical or ethical challenges in conducting the appropriate human clinical trials. While
extensive data from clinical trials is absent, there are requirements for rigorous post-marketing
surveillance. The second is the Special Access Program (SAP), which is open to seriously-ill
patients for whom conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or are unavailable. Supported by ss C.08.010 and C.08.011 of the Food and Drug Regulations, it is triggered by a
healthcare professional request, and it authorizes a manufacturer to sell a drug that cannot
otherwise be sold or distributed in Canada. The antiviral remdesivir was accessed under the
SAP up to July 27, 2020, after which it was approved by Health Canada, subject to conditions
that the company provide data from the trials conducted to date as well as periodic safety
reports. Remdesivir Authorized with Conditions for the Treatment of Patients in Canada with
Severe
COVID-19
Symptoms,
HEALTH
CANADA
(July
28,
2020),
44
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Interim Orders—was adopted in relation to the approval process for the COVID19 vaccines. The Minister exercised the discretion to make Interim Orders containing any provision that may be contained in a regulation made under the Act
if the Minister believes that immediate action is required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to health, safety, or the environment.47
On May 23, 2020, the Minister issued an Interim Order Respecting Clinical
Trials for Medical Devices and Drugs Relating to COVID-19 (2020),48 which
reduced administrative requirements when assessing the use of existing marketed
products as possible COVID-19-related therapies; permitted alternate means of
obtaining patient consent; broadened the criteria for qualified health professionals who can carry out qualified investigator duties at remote sites; and expanded
the range of applicants able to apply for medical device clinical trial authorizations. Health Canada emphasized that it remained committed to prioritizing the
review of all COVID-19 clinical trial applications within fourteen days, both
through the usual pathway and this alternative regulatory pathway.49
On September 16, 2020, the Minister issued an Interim Order Respecting the
Importation, Sale and Advertising of Drugs for Use in Relation to COVID-19
(2020),50 which created an expedited pathway to market approval for drugs and
vaccines aimed at COVID-19.51 Health Canada stated that its “objective was to
expedite the authorization for the importation, sale, and advertising of drugs used
https://healthycanadians.gc.ca/recall-alert-rappel-avis/hc-sc/2020/73621a-eng.php. For more
on these accelerated pathways, see Guidance Document: Submission and Information Requirements for Extraordinary Use New Drugs (EUNDs), GOV’T CANADA (May 16, 2014),
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/hc-sc/dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/brgtherap/applic-demande/guides/eund-dnue-eng.pdf; Health Canada’s Special Access Program: Request a Drug, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/special-access/drugs.html.
47
Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27 at 30.1(1). In addition, the Governor-in-Council
can make regulations that it considers necessary for the purpose of preventing shortages of
therapeutic products in Canada, or for alleviating those shortages or their effects, in order to
protect human health. Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27 at 30(1.4) (repealed 2020).
48
See MINISTER OF HEALTH, INTERIM ORDER RESPECTING CLINICAL TRIALS FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES AND DRUGS RELATING TO COVID-19 (2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/interim-order-respecting-clinical-trialsmedical-devices-drugs.html.
49
Interim Order Respecting Clinical Trials for Medical Devices and Drugs Relating to
COVID-19: Notice, GOV’T CANADA (May 27, 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/interim-order-respecting-clinical-trialsmedical-devices-drugs/notice-interim-order.html#wb-cont.
50
MINISTER OF HEALTH, INTERIM ORDER RESPECTING THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND
ADVERTISING OF DRUGS FOR USE IN RELATION TO COVID-19 (2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/drugs-vaccinestreatments/interim-order-import-sale-advertising-drugs.html.
51
Drugs and Vaccines for COVID-19: Overview, GOV’T CANADA (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/drugs-vaccines-treatments/authorization.html.
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in relation to COVID-19 and establishment licensing, while taking into consideration urgent public health needs[.]”52 It went on to state that market authorization will be:
predicated on the Minister’s determination that the evidence provided supports the conclusion that the benefits outweigh the risks
associated with the drug, taking into account the uncertainties related to the benefits and risks, as well as the urgent public health
need caused by COVID-19. This includes weighing the risks of
modifying certain requirements for information to support the
safety and effectiveness of a drug, such as allowing consideration
of a foreign regulatory approval, against the benefits of having it
available to Canadians quickly.53
Ultimately, the Interim Order introduced three mechanisms for Health Canada
to expedite the availability of COVID-19 drugs in Canada:
•

•

•

Reduced Data: Authorizing a drug, including those not yet licensed
in Canada or other jurisdictions, based on a modified set of application requirements (with the potential for a “rolling” submission of information as it becomes available);
Foreign Approval: Authorizing a drug included on The List of Foreign Drugs based on certain elements being approved by a trusted
foreign regulatory authority (e.g., Europe’s European Medicines
Agency, or regulators from Australia, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States) where they have been
shown to provide some benefit in the context of COVID-19;
Expanded Indications: Expanding the indication for an already approved drug to include a COVID-19 indication based on known evidence, with or without an application from the market authorization
holder (i.e., an expanded age group or population compared to that in
the existing NOC).54

The Interim Order also introduces a mechanism whereby drugs that show
promise for treating or preventing COVID-19 can be imported and “pre-positioned” or placed in Canadian facilities before their authorization to allow for
52

Explanatory Note: Interim Order Respecting the Importation, Sale and Advertising of
Drugs for Use in Relation to COVID-19, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/drugs-vaccines-treatments/interimorder-import-sale-advertising-drugs/note.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
53
Id.
54
MINISTER OF HEALTH, supra note 50.
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quicker distribution after authorization.55 The use of pre-positioning is restricted
to promising COVID-19 drugs for which the Government of Canada has entered
into a Procurement Agreement with the manufacturer.56 When proceeding under
the Interim Order, applications are not subject to the fees that apply when operating under the regular regime.57 The Interim Order is only valid for a one-year
term and product authorizations issued under it are only valid while the Interim
Order is in effect, but Health Canada is developing transition measures to avoid
disruptions when the Interim Order ends.58
The COVID-19 response has accentuated the pre-existing concerns around
transparency insofar as it has eased standards around both clinical trials and regulatory approval for importing and selling without clearly indicating how this
has happened and what its potential consequences are. A lack of transparency
around clinical trial data poses potentially significant risks to trial participants
and patients, it jeopardizes clinical trial quality, and it could undermine trust in
key actors and thereby contribute to vaccine hesitancy. This easing of standards
must be understood against a background of demonstrated reporting bias in relation to trial outcomes,59 and a general reluctance on the part of key actors to
release relevant data in a timely fashion.60 Ultimately, the scrutiny to which vaccine candidates are subject varies, and the effective functioning of the safety system has been criticized on this point.61 On this point, it has been argued that, to
begin with, decisions have been made on less-than-ideal amounts of data:
In the context of the current pandemic . . . Health Canada has
shown a willingness to accept data on a piecemeal basis and even
approved one drug (remdesivir) without the benefit of CSRs
[Clinical Study Reports]. Until those CSRs are submitted to
Health Canada little to no information about remdesivir’s safety
and efficacy is likely to be published via the [Clinical
55

Alice Tseng & Nancy Pei, New Interim Order for COVID-19 Drugs Has Wide-reaching
Impact, Allowing Minister to Unilaterally Expand Indication for Non-COVID-19 Drugs,
SMART & BIGGAR (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.smartbiggar.ca/insights/publication/new-interim-order-for-covid-19-drugs-has-wide-reaching-impact-allowing-minister-to-unilaterallyexpand-indication-for-non-covid-19-drugs.
56
MINISTER OF HEALTH, supra note 50, s 27(c).
57
Tseng & Pei, supra note 55.
58
Id.
59
Natalie McGauran et al., Reporting Bias in Medical Research: A Narrative Review, 11
TRIALS 1–15 (2010).
60
Matthew Herder et al., Against Vaccine Assay Secrecy, 11 HUMAN VACCINES &
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 498, 498–503 (2015); see also Aaron Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly,
and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval
Data under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 443, 443-503 (2004).
61
Janice Graham et al., Capacity for a Global Vaccine Safety System: The Perspective of
National Regulatory Authorities, 30 VACCINE 4953, 4953–59 (2012).
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Information] Portal. With the Interim Order’s introduction of a
new expedited “rolling application” process it is unclear how
much data Health Canada will have to release at the time of market authorization.62
In addition to relying on less data, governments also shared with the public
insufficient amounts of information with the public about both the regulatory
process and decision-making, and the details of the vaccine candidates. While
sharing less information might theoretically limit fears relating to potential
AEFIs, the current process:
echoes government-driven vaccine races from the past, such as
the one developed for the forecasted 1976 influenza pandemic,
the side effects of which helped to propel anti-vaccination movements to this very day. A COVID-19 intervention that is administered to whole swaths of the world’s population—without full
transparency about its safety and efficacy—may engender lasting
distrust not only against COVID-19 vaccines but a range of other
infectious disease interventions with more established safety and
efficacy profiles. The best way to prevent that outcome is to ensure high quality clinical trials, independent scrutiny of the resulting findings, and an unprecedented level of regulatory candour
about experimental COVID-19 interventions in real-time. Enhanced transparency should be a marker of the intervention’s
trustworthiness—an expression of the regulatory system’s effort
to convey what is known, to open that knowledge and judgment
up to outsiders, and to invite critical reflection about whether a
particular drug or vaccine will help us to re-emerge from COVID19.63
Though the Minister has discretion with respect to releasing certain types of
data under certain conditions to certain parties,64 previous Ministers have proven
reluctant to share data, particularly if there was a concern that it could be classified as confidential business information.65 Again, this reflects the culture of nondisclosure that exists in this stage of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem.
62

Edmonds et al., supra note 41, at 19.
Id. at 28.
64
See Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 3.3, 21.2(3)(a) (Can.).
65
Cf. Regulatory Transparency and Openness Framework and Action Plan 2015-2018,
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/regulatorytransparency-and-openness/regulatory-transparency-openness-framework-action-plan-20152018.html (last modified June 23, 2015).
63
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The realities of the COVID-19 pandemic combined with the compressed nature of COVID-19 vaccine development has made Health Canada’s historical
‘closed shop’ approach more susceptible to distrust from the public. In an approval process that is sensitive to transparency—whether the development and
approval process is normal or accelerated and compressed—Health Canada
would make information such as trial design, raw safety and efficacy data, outcome measures, researcher and regulator correspondence, and patient-level data
(i.e., blinding and randomization protocols, serious adverse events within trials,
etc.) available in real-time, or at least a timely fashion. Under current practices,
they are often released late, and in some cases not at all, which seriously hampers
the capacity of third-parties to re-analyze trials or to effectively assess the data
on which regulatory decisions have been made.66 In the past, such re-analyses
have revealed discrepancies between reported findings and actual trial results.67
Quite simply, far too much remains non-transparent with the consequence that
questions arise as to who actually benefits. Trust in the system, which is already
criticized as being too cozy as between the regulators and the for-profit regulatees, who wield too much power, is undermined, and vaccine acceptance is
reduced.

IV.

THE CLINICAL SURVEILLANCE STAGE: AN ABSENCE OF
STANDARDS FOR AEFIS

In this section, we turn to another stage in the vaccine development and safety
ecosystem, namely that of clinical surveillance. Public tolerance of safety shortfalls in vaccines is significantly lower than that related to medicines administered
to persons who are already sick because, where most pharmaceutical products
are administered to ill persons for curative purposes, vaccines are usually given
to healthy persons for preventative purposes.68 This lower risk tolerance translates into a need for an obviously robust and joined-up governance ecosystem
that is sensitive to safety from development to deployment. While the above discussion suggests that the existing ecosystem does exhibit concern for safety, this
concern is not realized through effective mechanisms in the clinical surveillance
stage.
As indicated, the pre-clinical stages of the ecosystem are unable to furnish
complete safety profiles for vaccine candidates. The real-world safety and effectiveness of vaccines can therefore only be known following widespread use and
66

Edmonds et al., supra note 41.
Johanna Le Noury et al., Restoring Study 329: Efficacy and Harms of Paroxetine and
Imipramine in Treatment of Major Depression in Adolescence, 351 BMJ h4320 (2015).
68
Vaccine Safety Basics Learning Manual, supra note 34, at 14.
67
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epidemiological tracking for AEFIs. In the case of COVID-19 vaccines, safety
and effectiveness will likely vary from one vaccine to another, by age group, by
medical condition, and potentially by geographic diversity69 and temporal remoteness from immunization, making the systematic collection of reliable data
at this stage doubly important. Ideally, such data would be available to national
authorities like Canada’s NACI in real-time so it can determine which vaccines
are the most effective for different populations and fine-tune its COVID-19 recommendations in a vaccine-specific manner. In short, there is a pressing need to
consistently and reliably (1) identify serious AEFIs, (2) report serious AEFIs, (3)
assess serious AEFIs, and (4) support individuals who experience serious AEFIs
causally connected to the vaccine or vaccine administering system.
However, as a result of design deficiencies in the Canadian regulatory framework, there exists a barrier to effective practice in the first step: identifying serious AEFIs. There is no contained standard or even harmonized understanding of
this core concept; there is no single, sufficiently specific and compelling definition of an AEFI. Every province and territory in Canada has a public health promotion statute of some kind, and all of them address immunization to some degree. However, seven Canadian jurisdictions simply do not legislatively define
what constitutes a reportable AEFI (e.g., Newfoundland & Labrador (NL), Nova
Scotia (NS), New Brunswick (NB), Prince Edward Island (PEI), Saskatchewan
(SK), North West Territories (NWT), Yukon (YK)).70 Both Quebec (QC) and

69

The interim analysis of Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine Phase III trial, released January 29, 2021, showed 72% efficacy in the United States but just 57% in South
Africa. Jansen Investigational CPVID-19 Vaccine: Interim Analysis of Phase 3 Clinical Data
Released, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-announces-single-shot-janssen-covid-19-vaccine-candidate-met-primary-endpoints-in-interimanalysis-of-its-phase-3-ensemble-trial.
70
Some of these jurisdictions may offer a non-legal definition at the policy or guidance
level. For example, the Nova Scotia Immunization Manual stipulates that serious AEFIs should
be reported by healthcare professionals, offering reasons why this is so, and how it should be
done. It does not clearly articulate a definition for AEFIs, but states that, an “Adverse Event
Following Immunization” should be reported when the event:
• Has a temporal association with a vaccine: Please refer to the Summary of Reporting
Criteria. Temporal association alone (i.e. onset of an event following receipt of vaccine)
is not proof of causation.
• Has no other clear cause at the time of reporting: A causal relationship between immunization and the event that follows does not need to be proven and submitting a report
does not imply or establish causality. Sometimes the vaccinee’s medical history, recent
disease, concurrent illness/condition and/or concomitant medication(s) can explain the
event(s).
• Is serious in nature: A serious adverse event is one that is life threatening or results in
death, requires hospitalization (≥24 hours) or prolongation of an existing hospitalization, results in residual disability or associated with a congenital malformation.
• Is unusual or unexpected: An event that has either not been identified previously or one
that has been identified previously but is being reported at an increased frequency. For
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Nunavut (NU) have definitions, but they are vague, imprecise, seemingly overbroad, or otherwise provide little practical guidance for AEFI reporting. Those
with a precise or relatively clear definition of what constitutes a reportable
AEFI—Ontario (ON), Manitoba (MB), Alberta (AB), British Columbia (BC)—
all conflict to varying degrees as to what constitutes a reportable AEFI. For the
legislative definitions in operation, see Table 1.
Table 1
Legal Definitions of AEFIs
P/T Statute
NL
Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, SNL 2018, c. P-37.3
NS
Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c. 4
PEI Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c. P30.1
NB
Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c. P22.4
QC Public Health Act, c. s-2.2

ON

Definition
No Definition Found
No Definition Found
No Definition Found
No Definition Found

s 69 [a]n unusual clinical manifestation, temporally associated with vaccination, in a person having received a vaccine or a contact of
that person and [where the physician] suspects
a link between the vaccine and the unusual
clinical manifestation.
Health Protection and Promotion Act, s 38(1) “reportable event” means, (a) persisRSO 1990, c. H.7
tent crying or screaming, anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock occurring within forty-eight
hours after the administration of an immunizing agent, (b) shock-like collapse, high fever
or convulsions occurring within three days after the administration of an immunizing agent,
(c) arthritis occurring within forty-two days
after the administration of an immunizing
agent, (d) generalized urticaria, residual

additional information regarding unusual or unexpected events, please refer to the Canadian Immunization Guide.
• Clusters of events: known or new events that occur in a geographic or temporal cluster
(e.g. 6 in a week, or 6 in a zone) that require further assessment, even if the total number
of AEFIs may not be higher than expected.
It goes on to state that most vaccines reactions are mild and self-limited and local (e.g., tenderness or redness at injection site) or systemic (e.g., fever, joint or muscle pain) but are minor
in severity, and those outlined in the vaccine product monograph do not need to be reported.
PROVINCE OF N.S., NOVA SCOTIA IMMUNIZATION MANUAL 87 (2019), https://novascotia.ca/dhw/cdpc/documents/Immunization-Manual.pdf.
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MB

seizure disorder, encephalopathy, encephalitis
or any other significant occurrence occurring
within fifteen days after the administration of
an immunizing agent, or (e) death occurring at
any time and following upon a symptom described in clause (a), (b), (c) or (d).
Immunization Regulations, M Reg. s 2(1) For the purposes of the definition “re36/2009, adopted under the Public portable event” in s 56 of the Act, a reportable
Health Act, CCSM c. P210
event means an adverse event set out in subsection (2) that is temporally associated with
an immunizing agent, cannot be attributed to
a co-existing condition, and that meets at least
one of the following criteria:
(a) the event is life-threatening, could result in
permanent disability, requires hospitalization
or urgent medical attention, or for any other
reason is considered to be of a serious nature;
(b) the event is unusual or unexpected, including, without limitation, (i) an event that has
not been previously identified, or (ii) an event
that has been previously identified but is being
reported at an increased frequency;
(c) at the time of the report there is nothing in
the patient’s medical history—such as a recent
disease or illness, or the taking of medication—that could explain the event.
s 2(2) The following are ‘adverse events’ for
the purpose of subsection (1):
(a) a local reaction at or near the injection site;
(b) anaphylaxis;
(c) an allergic reaction of any of the following
types: (i) skin or mucosal, either at or near the
injection site or generalized, (ii) cardiovascular, (iii) respiratory, (iv) gastrointestinal;
(d) one or more of the following: (i) seizures,
(ii) meningitis*, (iii) Guillain-Barré Syndrome*, (iv) Bell’s Palsy*, (v) paralysis other
than Bell’s Palsy*, (vi) encephalopathy* or
encephalitis*, (vii) hypotonic or hyporesponsive episode (age less than two years), (viii)
persistent crying (continuous and unaltered
for more than three hours), (ix) rash, (x) arthritis,
(xi)
intussusception*,
(xii)
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thrombocytopenia*, (xiii) parotitis, (xiv) oculo-respiratory syndrome;
* as diagnosed by a physician
(e) a serious event not described in clauses (a)
to (d).
Public Health Act, SSK 1994, c. P- No Definition Found
37.1
Immunization Regulation, AB Reg. s 1(2) For the purposes of this Regulation and
182/2018, adopted under the Public s 18.4 of the Act, “adverse event following imHealth Act, RSA 2000, c. P-37
munization” means an unfavourable health
occurrence experienced by a patient that (a)
follows immunization, (b) cannot be attributed to a pre-existing condition, and (c)
meets one or more of the following criteria, as
determined by a health practitioner:
(i) the health occurrence is life-threatening,
could result in permanent disability, requires
hospitalization or urgent medical attention, or
for any other reason is considered to be of a
serious nature;
(ii) the health occurrence is unusual or unexpected, including, without limitation, an occurrence that (A) has not previously been
identified, or (B) has previously been identified but is being reported at increased frequency;
(iii) the health occurrence cannot be explained
by anything in the patient’s medical history,
including, without limitation, a recent disease
or illness, or consumption of medication.
Reporting Information Affecting Pub- s 5(1) “adverse event following immunizalic Health Regulation, BC Reg. tion” means a negative change in a person’s
167/2018, adopted under the Public health that (a) occurs after the person receives
Health Act, SBC 2008, c. 28
an immunization, (b) is serious, unusual or unexpected, or for which medical attention is
sought, and (c) cannot clearly be attributed to
a cause other than the immunization.
Reporting and Disease Control Regu- s 1 “adverse event following immunization”
lations, NU Reg 051-2019, adopted means an adverse medical event which has a
under the Public Health Act, SNu temporal association, but not necessarily a
2016, c. 13
causal association, with the administration of
an immunizing agent and which cannot be
clearly attributed to other causes.
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NWT Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c. 17 No Definition Found
YK Public Health and Safety Act, RSY No Definition Found
2002, c. 176
This patchwork of definitions poses challenges for effective clinical surveillance. A jurisdiction with a broader definition of an AEFI would likely report
higher AEFI rates than provinces with a narrower definition. Those provinces
with no legal definition would rely on healthcare providers to articulate and act
upon their own definition. Thus, even if there is no real difference in the safety
profile of a vaccine from one jurisdiction to another, the opposite may appear to
be the case based on reported AEFIs. In addition to obscuring actual jurisdictional differences in vaccine safety, this reality could undermine a national understanding of the real-world safety and efficacy of a vaccine, and it could frustrate reliable comparisons with other countries. It could also negatively and
inappropriately skew public perceptions of vaccine safety. A common and clear
Canada-wide definition which aligns with an international standard would allow
for meaningful comparisons between AEFI rates in different sub-national jurisdictions and internationally, and it would allow for more accurate and easily aggregated data across jurisdictions to detect safety signals.71
The second element of a clinical surveillance system is to ensure consistent
and timely reporting of AEFIs to health authorities. The Canadian vaccine development and safety ecosystem contains several clinical surveillance systems,
being the following:
•

Canadian Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance System (CAEFISS): Managed by the Public Health Agency of Canada
(PHAC), CAEFISS is a federal, provincial, territorial collaboration
commencing in 1987 the objectives of which are to: (1) continuously
monitor the safety of marketed vaccines in Canada; (2) identify increases in the frequency or severity of recognized AEFIs; (3) identify
previously unknown AEFIs that may be related to a vaccine; (4) identify areas that require further investigation or research; and (5) provide timely information for analysts and policy-makers on AEFI profiles for vaccines in Canada.72 CAEFISS receives reports from
physicians, nurses, or pharmacists who provide immunizations, or

71
See Vaccine Safety Basics Module 3: Adverse Events Following Immunization, Classification of AEFIs, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], https://vaccine-safety-training.org/classification-of-aefis.html (last visited March 8, 2021).
72
Canadian Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance System (CAEFISS),
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/immunization/canadianadverse-events-following-immunization-surveillance-system-caefiss.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2021).
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who care for individuals with AEFIs. The causal assessment is usually undertaken by the reporting healthcare provider, and the system
is passive insofar as it relies on individuals to identify an issue and
engage with the system.73
Immunization Monitoring Program ACTive (IMPACT): Overseen by
the Canadian Paediatric Society and funded by PHAC, IMPACT is a
more active system that feeds into CAEFISS. Nurse monitors in
twelve paediatric hospitals across Canada (which handle some 90%
of all paediatric tertiary care admissions) systematically search their
admissions records for vaccine-preventable diseases and selected infectious diseases in children that are (or will soon be) vaccine-preventable, vaccine failures, or AEFIs.74 When select medical events
are found to be temporally linked to immunization, they are reported
to CAEFISS, as well as to local and provincial and territorial health
officials. Provided there is sufficient information on which to make a
determination, PHAC undertakes a causality assessment using international practices and principles.75
Canada Vigilance Program (CVP): This is an infrastructure organization and platform which passively receives and then assesses reports
from health professionals and consumers about suspected adverse reactions to health products marketed in Canada, including prescription
and non-prescription medications, natural health products, biologics
(including vaccines), radiopharmaceuticals, and disinfectants and
sanitizers. While the CVP provides a variety of tools for health professionals and consumers to report suspected adverse reactions, reporting is voluntary.76
MedEffect: Under the Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS), the Marketed Health Products Directorate developed the MedEffect website,
which is meant to: (1) simplify completion and filing of adverse reaction reports via web, phone, fax, or mail; (2) build awareness about
the importance of reporting adverse reactions, and how this

Id.
IMPACT, CANADIAN PAEDIATRIC SOCIETY, https://www.cps.ca/en/impact (last updated
Nov. 10, 2020).
75
Causality Assessment of an Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI): User Manual for the Revised WHO Classification, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (2d ed. 2018),
https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/publications/aefi_manual.pdf?ua=1.
76
Canada Vigilance Program, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medeffect-canada/canada-vigilance-program.html#wbcont (last modified July 12, 2018). See also HEALTH CANADA, REPORTING ADVERSE
REACTIONS TO MARKETED HEALTH PRODUCTS—GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR INDUSTRY (2018),
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/documents/services/drugs-health-products/reportspublications/medeffect-canada/reporting-adverse-reactions-marketed-health-products-guidance-industry/reporting-adverse-reactions-marketed-health-products-guidance-industry.pdf.
74
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information is used to identify and communicate potential risks; and
(3) provide centralized public access to health product safety information (e.g., Health Canada’s Advisories, Warnings, and Recalls, the
Canadian Adverse Reaction Newsletter (CARN), and the Canadian
Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring Program (CADRMP)).77
Canadian Immunization Research Network (CIRN): To help manage
affairs when an AEFI is discovered, and to help overcome concomitant reluctance on the part of patients, parents, and healthcare workers, the CIRN established thirteen special immunization clinics
(SICs) staffed by paediatric and adult infectious disease specialists
and allergists experienced in dealing with challenging situations (i.e.,
high-risk patients, etc.), which cases are logged into a central registry
to enable review of further immunization outcomes for people with
similar AEFIs, as well as to better evaluate management protocols.78

Unfortunately, these systems do not coalesce into a comprehensive or harmonized framework for the systematic reporting and collection of immune-relevant
data, including that around AEFIs; they are mostly voluntary, they do not capture
all of the places and avenues where AEFIs might be discovered and relevant data
collected, and those sources that are captured are not integrated.79 Contrary to
these largely passive (or voluntary, report-driven) mechanisms, the regulatory
framework, in a breathtaking disjunct, imposes—albeit unevenly—mandatory
AEFI reporting.
The Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Serious Adverse
Drug Reaction Reporting—Hospitals),80 which came into effect in December
2019, give effect to s 21.8 FDA. Under Regulation C.01.020.1(1), only hospitals
are “prescribed health care institutions” obligated to provide to the Minister

77
MedEffect Canada, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medeffect-canada.html (last modified Mar. 5, 2021).
78
Karina Top et al., Canadian Paediatricians’ Approaches to Managing Patients with
Adverse Events Following Immunization: The Role of the Special Immunization Clinic Network, 19 PAEDIATR CHILD HEALTH 310–14 (2014).
79
Nor are they linked to a fully integrated patient-centered health information system designed to facilitate the determination of background rates and other relevant factors. Panorama—the Provincial Public Health Information System Panorama, an electronic health record
system that stores and allows authorized providers access to public health services received in
the province—was supposed to deliver this data accessibility, but after some twenty years of
evolution it remains only partially useful because it does not capture all the health data relevant
for making sound assessments and decisions. For more, see An Audit of the Panorama Public
Health System, AUDITOR GEN. BRITISH COLUMBIA (Aug. 2015), https://www.bcauditor.com/sites/default/files/publications/reports/OAGBC_PanoramaReport_FINAL.pdf.
80
SOR/2019-190 (Can.).
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information that is in their control about a “serious adverse drug reaction.”81 Regulation C.01.020.1(2) identifies the ‘prescribed information’ that hospitals must
provide to the Minister within 30 days. However, because surveillance is limited
to hospitals, the Regulation neglects significant sources and avenues of information, such as that arising from physicians, nurses, or nurse practitioners working in family or general practices, in clinics, or in congregate living facilities, as
well as information that may be held by health authorities, and their data are not
being systematically collected, aggregated, or assessed. Even with respect to hospitals, Regulation C.01.020.1(3) FDR states that a hospital is exempt from s 21.8
FDA with respect to reporting this information if, inter alia, the information relates to a vaccine that was administered under a routine immunization program
of a province.
Given the above, one must turn to the provinces and territories for further
guidance on reporting. Eleven of Canada’s thirteen sub-national jurisdictions impose mandates; Newfoundland & Labrador and Yukon are without mandatory
AEFI reporting. In all cases where mandates exist, there are potentially significant penalties for failure to report, which suggests that, as a policy matter, governments recognize that tracking AEFIs is important. Ontario goes farthest regarding mandates and penalties, stipulating that the healthcare provider
administering a vaccine must inform the patient of the importance of immediately seeking healthcare should an AEFI occur.82
Table 2
Mandatory AEFI Reporting & Penalties
P/T Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
NL
NS

NA
Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c. 4, ss 31(1), 71(1);

81

Mandate
No
Yes

Penalty

Fine: $2,000
Prison: 6 months

C.R.C., c. 870 C.01.020.1(1). Under Regulation C.01.020.1(4), the term “hospital”

means
a facility (a) that is licensed, approved or designated as a hospital by a province in accordance with the laws of the province to provide care or treatment
to persons suffering from any form of disease or illness; or (b) that is operated by the Government of Canada and that provides health services to inpatients.
82
Province of Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, s 38(2).
It is not clear what effect, if any, this interaction has on patients (i.e., whether it causes patients
to seek medical attention more quickly, or whether it causes anxiety and unnecessary
healthcare visits); see also infra 18 tbl. 2 (providing the penalty for non-compliance with mandatory AEFI reporting).
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PEI

Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Conditions Regulations, NS Reg 195/2005, s 11(1).
Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c. P-30.1, s 66(1);
Yes
Immunization Regulations to the Public Health Act, s 4.

NB

Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c. P-22.4, ss 27(1)(c) and Yes
52(1);
Reporting and Diseases Regulations, s 18; Provincial Offences Procedure Act, s 56(3).

QC
ON
MB

Public Health Act, c. s-2.2, ss 69 and 138.
Yes
Health Protection and Promotion Act, RSO 1990, c. H.7, Yes
ss 38 and 100(2).
Public Health Act, CCSM c. P210, ss 59 and 90.
Yes

SK

Public Health Act, SSK 1994, c. P-37.1, ss 23(1) and 61. Yes

AB

Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c. P-37, ss 5(1) and 73(3). Yes

BC

Public Health Act, SBC 2008, c. 28, ss 12 and 99(1)(d); Yes
Reporting Information Affecting Public Health Regulation, BC Reg 167/2018, s 5.
Public Health Act, SNu 2016, c. 13, ss 12 and 80(1);
Yes
Reporting and Disease Control Regulations, NU Reg
051-2019, s 2(2)(b).

NU

NWT Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c. 17, ss 3(2) and Yes
49(1)(a).

YK

Fine:
$1,000
($10,000 for 3+
offences)
Prison: 6 months
Fine:
$1,100
($2,100 for 2+ offences)
(Category C offence)
Fine: $1,200
Fine: $5,000
Fine: $50,000
Prison: 6 months
Fine:
$75,000
($100,000 for 2+
offences)
Fine: $100,000
($500,000 for 2+
offences)
Fine: $25,000
Prison: 6 months
Fine:
$50,000
($100,000 for 2+
offences)
Prison: One year
Fine:
$10,000
($25,000 for 2+
offences)
Prison: 6 months
(1 year for 2+ offences)

No
However, it is questionable the extent to which these mandates are enforced.
There is no information available on enforcement, but the authors’ practical
knowledge of, and engagement with, this field, combined with a legal search of
reported cases, suggests a general absence of attention to mandate enforcement
and imposition of statutory penalties. Ultimately, there are no strong motivators

558

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 49:533

for healthcare providers to vigilantly report AEFIs (assuming they can determine
that the condition they are seeing is following or associated with a vaccination).
On this point, the Canadian Medical Protective Association has noted that adverse events reporting across Canada remains uneven, in part due to non-harmonized legal obligations, and it recommends a consistent approach to reporting.83
Standardized reporting protocols combined with reporting to a central (national)
database would permit factual information to be gathered and would support system-wide data collection and analysis, including meta-analysis of incident and
occurrence trends.
We recommend that Canada (and other countries) adopt mandatory reporting
of serious AEFIs, imposing reporting obligations on all healthcare professionals
who administer vaccines or are expected to treat patients post-immunization. In
short, mandates need to exist on those who perform healthcare duties in hospitalbased, clinic-based, and congregated care-based contexts, which includes individuals such as physicians, family physicians, public health nurses, nurse practitioners, and pharmacists. Obviously, this reporting must be imposed not only on
and through hospitals, but also on individual healthcare providers in a range of
care settings, and on health authorities.
The third element in a clinical surveillance system is to ensure consistent, reliable, and timely assessment of serious AEFIs. Given the relatively low levels
of attention paid to public health and preventative medicine both generally and
in healthcare training (and specifically in medical schools), it is unclear the extent to which healthcare providers are uniformly equipped to consistently identify, much less reliably assess, AEFIs. Many healthcare providers who administer vaccinations (e.g., nurses and pharmacists), and many who may see patients
for health-related events post-vaccination (e.g., family physicians), will not have
the training or experience to confidently assess whether an event is causally related to vaccination.
Further, both these healthcare providers and more suitable assessors will be
further stymied by the fact that there exists no single repository for storing immunization status or AEFI data. Data that will be important to collect from patients experiencing a medically significant event include: their demographic information (i.e., age, sex, ethnicity, location, etc.); their immunization history and
status; their general health condition, including medications and allergies; the
83
CMPA, Medical-Legal Handbook for Physicians in Canada, Version 8.3 (2020),
https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/handbooks/medical-legal-handbook-forphysicians-in-canada#harm-from-healthcare-delivery. For more on the inadequacy of postmarket surveillance regulation, see Joel Lexchin, Health Canada’s Use of its Notice of Compliance with Conditions Drug Approval Policy: A Retrospective Cohort Analysis, 49 INT’L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 294–305 (2019). For a critic of the U.S. system, see Joshua D. Wallach et al.,
Postmarket Studies Required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for New Drugs and
Biologics Approved Between 2009 and 2012: Cross Sectional Analysis, BRIT. MED. J. 1 (Apr.
16, 2018).
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existence of any previous adverse reactions to vaccination; whether a COVID19 vaccine was received, and which one; when and where the vaccine was received, and how was it delivered; and how the vaccine was tolerated at the time
of inoculation.
However, as noted, Canada relies on multiple-discontinuous-electronic personal health information (PHI) platforms, and there is no widely-shared access
point for retrieving existing AEFI data in real time (i.e., there are few links between hospital data, community clinic office data, and immunization registry
data such that reliable data can be aggregated in pursuit of reliable assessments).
Without access to such data—very granular data easily accessed by assessors—
neither reliable vaccine safety (AEFI occurrence) determinations nor reliable
vaccine effectiveness determinations can be made because they will rely on an
incomplete or inaccurate evidentiary base considered by individuals not in a position to robustly assess the data. Under the present system, not all positive cases
will be queried with respect to the multiple issues that are pertinent, including
prior receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine (and then which vaccine, when and where
it was received, how it was delivered and tolerated, etc.). Such details are particularly important for differentiation of effectiveness of one vaccine versus another, and for answering such practically significant questions as:
•
•
•

Is the failure or event directly due to a storage and handling, diluent,
or other program error, or is it more probably linked to an element or
action of the specific vaccine?
Are failures or events being seen amongst others who received that
specific vaccine during that time period?
Are there underlying clinical reasons that may have altered response
to that specific vaccine?

To properly evaluate these questions when a patient presents with a possible
AEFI, the assessor requires access to significantly more data than is currently
collected by the fragmented systems that exist.
We recommend that each national jurisdiction should found a single, central,
independent, and interdisciplinary body which is tasked with assessing for causation all reported serious AEFIs. Only through reliance on a single expert body
can decision-makers be assured that a consistent analysis using common factors,
like evidence and national standards, is being applied. This body could then classify post-immunization medical events as vaccine-related, program-related, or
unrelated AEFIs. To do this effectively, there should also exist a ‘large linked
database’ (LLDB).84 Although some countries have successfully implemented
84

Vaccine Safety Basics: Learning Manual, supra note 34, at 28. This Learning Manual
notes that LLDBs are discrete administrative databases created independently from each other
that are linked to enable the sharing of data across platforms. Id. With sufficient integration,
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relatively low-cost, patient-centered, and integrated health information systems
that can be searched in real-time,85 Canada has not done so.
The final element of a comprehensive clinical surveillance system, and one
that may additionally impact public trust and acceptance of vaccines, is support
for those patients who have experienced a serious AEFI related to the program
or the vaccine. Such support should come in the form of a Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), which programs are not uncommon in the many
high-income countries. As of 2011, the only G8 countries without a national
VICP were Canada and Russia,86 and currently, twenty-four countries and the
province of Quebec have such programs.87 VICPs are typically instituted based
on a belief that governments have a special responsibility to those injured by
properly manufactured and administered vaccines used in public health programs; they are increasingly seen as an important component of vaccination programs.88 They are particularly important given the abysmal success of tort claims
relating to vaccine injuries.89 VICPs have produced positive experiences,90 with
the existence of such programs contributing to:91
they can detect very rare ARs and AEFIs, and can provide an economical and rapid means of
conducting post-licensure studies of the safety of drugs and vaccines. Id. They can also facilitate the testing of hypotheses when signals or allegations create suspicions of a possible vaccine safety issue. Id.
85
Michael Graven et al., Decline in Mortality with the Belize Integrated Patient-Centred
Country Wide Health Information System (BHIS) with Embedded Program Management, 82
INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS 954–63 (2013); see also Michael Krausz et al., Emergency Response to COVID-19 in Canada: Platform Development and Implementation for eHealth in
Crisis Management, 6 JMIR PUB. HEALTH & SURVEILLANCE e18995 (2020) (outlining the triage, monitoring, and service-provision platform).
86
Roger Collier, No-Fault Compensation Program Overdue, Experts Say, 183 CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N J. E263 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060206/.
87
Randy G. Mungwira et al., Global Landscape Analysis of No-Fault Compensation Programmes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of Implementing Countries, 15 PLOS
ONE 1, 4 (2020), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0233334.
For more on the Quebec program, see Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs: Rationale and an Overview of the Québec Program, 46 CAN. COMMUNICABLE DISEASE
REP. 305–08 (2020).
88
Geoffrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, 17 VACCINE S25–
S35 (1999).
89
For a now dated U.K. examination, see Stephanie Pywell, A Critical Review of the Recent and Impending Changes to the Law of Statutory Compensation for Vaccine Damage, 246
J. PERS. INJ. LITIG. ONLINE 4 (2000). The Canadian setting exhibits a similar trend.
90
See Ruth Tindley, A Critical Analysis of the Vaccine Damage Payments Scheme, 19
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 321 (2008) (providing the U.K. experience with VICPs); see Laine Rutkow
et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program and its Influence During the Last Two Decades, 111 PENN ST.
L. REV. 681 (2006) (examining the U.S. experience with VICPs); Katherine Cook & Geoffrey
Evans, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 127 PEDIATRICS S74 (2011).
91
Kimberly M. Thompson et al., Performance of the United States Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP): 1988–2019, 38 VACCINE 1, 6 (2020); see also H. Cody Meissner,
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•
•
•

better evidence around vaccine safety;
better evidence around the nature of injuries relating to (specific) vaccines; and
greater confidence in vaccines.

Ultimately, in addition to representing important supports for people who have
been injured, such programs signal to the public that the government and health
authorities are confident in the products being delivered. In this way, these programs are one of the many tools needed to combat vaccine hesitancy.
All told, the prevailing vaccine surveillance system in Canada is neither designed nor sufficiently powered to encourage justified trust in the vaccines administered, even when they are in fact safe and effective. A significant barrier to
a more robust, comprehensive, and harmonized system is the persistent insinuation into framework development efforts of the many vested interests across Canada and of provinces and territories. As an example, consider the 2003 National
Immunization Strategy, a multi-million-dollar plan to align vaccination schedules and expand access across Canada, which ultimately failed due to the jurisdictional differences in epidemiology, vaccine delivery systems, and financial
means.92

V.

CONCLUSIONS

Both market authorization and AEFI reporting are part of Canada’s vaccine
development and safety ecosystem. However, they exhibit operational and design shortcomings which may well undermine public trust in the actors and systems, and public acceptance of the vaccines.
With respect to the market authorization stage, while useful flexibilities exist
to facilitate rapid development and authorization, the process for doing so is not
at all transparent, veiling substantial amounts of data, and obscuring the assessment process undertaken by regulators. To remedy this, the Minister should exercise the discretion granted under the FDA and FDR to expand Health Canada’s
data-sharing practices in relation to vaccine approvals, and to move those expanded sharing practices further upstream in the authorization process. Greater
public trust cannot be achieved without transparent access to the raw data on
which decisions to approve and recommend vaccines are based.
et al., The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Striking a Balance Between Individual Rights and Community Benefit, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 343, 344 (2019).
92
Wayne Kondro, Progress Report on the National Immunization Strategy, 176
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1811–13 (2007).
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With respect to the clinical surveillance stage, which is aimed at determining
the real-world safety and effectiveness of vaccines, there is much that governments can do to improve identification, reporting, and assessment of AEFIs, and
to better support patients who have been injured as a result of vaccines or actions
taken within vaccine programs. In the Canadian context, preventative medicine
must feature more prominently in healthcare provider education, AEFI reporting
must be made mandatory in all Canadian jurisdictions and with respect to all
pertinent actors, with robust enforcement of such mandates, and reporting and
data systems must be strengthened (or implemented). Also, there should exist an
independent national expert body (equivalent to the NACI) that is tasked with
conducting causality assessments with respect to AEFIs. This would facilitate
quality of the causality assessment by injecting consistency in the standards applied, the factors taken into account, and the specific biological actions of the
subject vaccine.
Ultimately, the fragmented approach that prevails in Canada in relation to key
aspects of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem creates a sub-optimal
immunization environment that will not encourage justified trust and high rates
of vaccine acceptance. Long-term neglect of public health prior to the COVID19 pandemic has left systems under-resourced. The pandemic has simultaneously
highlighted both the fragility and the indispensability of public health in this
country and others. Strong action now—in advance of mass distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines and their possible inclusion in routine immunization programs—will strengthen national public health systems and better prepare them
for the next pandemic.

